Mesh networks with exclusion capability

ABSTRACT

In an exemplary method implementation, a method includes: designating a neighborhood administrator; receiving notification of a delinquent router from the designated neighborhood administrator; and excluding the delinquent router responsive to the notification. In an exemplary mesh router implementation, a mesh router is capable of establishing a wireless mesh network with other mesh routers, the mesh router is further capable of designating a neighborhood administrator mesh router; and the mesh router is adapted to exclude another mesh router that is associated with a particular certificate when the particular certificate has been identified as delinquent by the designated neighborhood administrator. mesh router.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This disclosure relates in general to mesh networks and in particular,by way of example but not limitation, to enabling the exclusion of adelinquent mesh router from a mesh network.

BACKGROUND

Wireless networks are increasingly used for the communication of bothvoice and data. Such wireless communication is effectuated bypropagating a wireless signal from a transmitter to a receiver, each ofwhich may constitute a node of a wireless network. Nodes in atraditional cellular wireless network, for example, include fixed basestations and mobile stations. Mobile stations access the cellularwireless network via the fixed based stations. The base stations areoperated by a network service provider that designs the cellularwireless network and is capable of controlling access to and/oremploying security measures in the wireless network. In other words, asingle entity operates multiple base stations on a large-scale basis andcan therefore provide a degree of organization and a measure ofsecurity, as well as a level of overall network management for thecellular wireless network.

Other types of wireless networks, such as spontaneous wireless networks,do not ordinarily entail such large-scale planning, organization, ormanagement. For example, ad hoc wireless networks are created bymultiple devices that mutually decide to join together to form nodes ofa wireless network, generally without prior or subsequent explicitagreement among owners of the multiple devices. Hence, there is nooverarching operator or other entity to enforce network access rules,handle security issues, monitor standards-based requirements, orguarantee generally-accepted wireless network behavior. Legitimate andillegitimate participants of such ad hoc networks can therefore actcarelessly, indiscriminately, or even maliciously without being subjectto significant restraints or any real repercussions.

Accordingly, there is a need for schemes and/or techniques that canintroduce a degree of control and/or accountability intospontaneously-formed wireless networks.

SUMMARY

In an exemplary method implementation, a method includes: designating aneighborhood administrator; receiving notification of a delinquentrouter from the designated neighborhood administrator; and excluding thedelinquent router responsive to the notification. In an exemplary meshrouter implementation, a mesh router is capable of establishing awireless mesh network with other mesh routers, the mesh router isfurther capable of designating a neighborhood administrator mesh router;and the mesh router is adapted to exclude another mesh router that isassociated with a particular certificate when the particular certificatehas been identified as delinquent by the designated neighborhoodadministrator mesh router. In an exemplary media implementation, one ormore processor-accessible media include processor-executableinstructions that, when executed, direct a device to perform actionsincluding: receiving notification of a delinquent mesh routercertificate from a neighborhood administrator as designated by thedevice, the delinquent mesh router certificate signed by an entity otherthan the neighborhood administrator; and excluding the delinquent meshrouter certificate responsive to the notification received from theneighborhood administrator.

Other method, system, approach, apparatus, router, device, media,procedure, arrangement, etc. implementations are described herein.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The same numbers are used throughout the drawings to reference likeand/or corresponding aspects, features, and components.

FIG. 1 is an exemplary wireless mesh network that includes a mesh routertier and an end device tier.

FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary public key infrastructure (PKI) at themesh router tier in which each mesh router is associated with acertificate.

FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary utilization of the PKI at the meshrouter tier for the communication of a packet.

FIG. 4 illustrates an exemplary neighborhood establishment for thewireless mesh network.

FIG. 5 illustrates an aspect of an exemplary exclusion mechanism withrespect to a delinquent mesh router/certificate.

FIG. 6 illustrates another aspect of the exemplary exclusion mechanismwith respect to the delinquent mesh router/certificate.

FIG. 7 is a flow diagram that illustrates an exemplary method forimplementing an exclusion capability in a wireless mesh network.

FIG. 8 illustrates an aspect of an exemplary recognition mechanism withrespect to an end device.

FIG. 9 illustrates another aspect of the exemplary recognition mechanismwith respect to the end device.

FIG. 10 is a flow diagram that illustrates an exemplary method forimplementing end device recognition in a wireless mesh network.

FIG. 11 illustrates another exemplary recognition mechanism with respectto an end device that is engaged in inter-neighborhood movement.

FIG. 12 illustrates an exemplary computing (or general device) operatingenvironment that is capable of (wholly or partially) implementing atleast one aspect of mesh networks as described herein.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

FIG. 1 is an exemplary wireless mesh network 100 that includes a meshrouter tier and an end device tier. The mesh router tier is formed frommesh routers 102, which create a mesh router network portion of wirelessmesh network 100. The end device tier is formed from end devices 104.End devices 104 may communicate with each other via one or more meshrouters 102 of the mesh router network.

As illustrated, five mesh routers 102(A), 102(B), 102(C), 102(D), and102(E) form the mesh router network so as to realize at least a portionof a multi-hop wireless network. However, two or more mesh routers 102(possibly tens, hundreds, thousands, etc.) may form the mesh routernetwork. Each mesh router 102 is capable of communicating wirelesslyusing, for example, a wireless transmitter and/or receiver (e.g., atransceiver).

Mesh router 102(A) has a wireless link 108AB with mesh router 102(B) anda wireless link 108AD with mesh router 102(D). Mesh router 102(B)additionally has wireless links 108BC and 108BE with mesh routers 102(C)and 102(E), respectively. Similarly, mesh router 102(C) is also inwireless communication with mesh router 102(E) over wireless link 108CE,and mesh router 102(E) is also in wireless communication with meshrouter 102(D) over wireless link 108DE.

Although each mesh router 102 is illustrated as being in wirelesscommunication with from one to three end devices 104, each mayalternatively be in communication with any number of end devices 104.Mesh router 102(A) is in wireless communication with two end devices104(A1) and 104(A2) over wireless links 110(A1) and 110(A2),respectively. Mesh router 102(B) is in wireless communication with oneend device 104(B1) over wireless link 110(B1). Mesh router 102(C) is inwireless communication with two end devices 104(C1) and 104(C2) overwireless links 110(C1) and 110(C2), respectively. Similarly, mesh router102(E) has wireless links 110(E) with three end devices 104(E1),104(E2), and 104(E3). Mesh router 102(D) has wireless links 110(D1) and110(D2) to two end devices 104(D1) and 104(D2), respectively.

In a described implementation, mesh routers 102 comprise a relativelystandard set of devices from an operational perspective. For example,each mesh router 102 may have similar (or even identical) hardwareand/or software. The hardware is capable of wireless communication andof executing the software (including firmware).

Mesh routers 102 are designed and/or manufactured by an entity to haveat least a baseline set of interoperable capabilities. For example, afirst production may result in identical mesh routers 102 from both ahardware and a software perspective for a first version. Available(e.g., software including firmware) upgrades may result in second andsubsequent versions that offer optional additional capabilities. Asecond production may result in mesh routers 102 of later versions thatdiffer from previous versions but are still backwards compatible. Inshort, the entity producing mesh routers 102 has some measure ofdetermination regarding the hardware and software components thereof.

In contradistinction, end devices 104 comprise a relatively diverse setof devices that may have arbitrary hardware and software with haphazardoperational capabilities. Each of end devices 104 may be a laptop, amobile phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a home computer, anentertainment or other appliance, and so forth. End devices 104 may beexecuting any of a variety of operating systems, applications, managedprogram coding, and so forth. While otherwise diverse, such end devices104 are capable of accessing wireless mesh network 100 using an acceptedprotocol via a mesh router 102.

An entity that is producing mesh routers 102 creates them such that astable and predictable mesh router network is relatively automaticallyestablished. The stability and predictability of the wireless meshrouter network is, of course, limited by the vagaries of wirelesscommunication as impacted by distance between transmitter and receiver,interference, changes to the wireless medium, and so forth.Nevertheless, when a mesh router 102 is activated, it attempts to join awireless mesh network 100 by communicating with any mesh routers 102that are in range. Establishing wireless mesh network 100 is describedfurther below with particular reference to FIGS. 2 and 3. Because theentity that is producing mesh routers 102 determines their operationalcapabilities, malicious or otherwise inappropriate network behavior canbe reduced to some extent.

End devices 104, on the other hand, may be capable of practicallyarbitrary and/or systematic malicious actions because their operationalcapabilities are not centrally controlled. However, the actions of enddevices 104 can be curtailed to some extent because end devices 104connect to wireless mesh network 100 through a mesh router 102, asindicated by wireless links 110. It should be noted that the wirelessaccess protocols governing (i) wireless links 110 for end device104-to-mesh router 102 communications and (ii) wireless links 108 forintra-mesh router 102 communications may be the same or different.

By way of example, if end device 104(A1) is attempting to send acommunication to end device 104(C1), end device 104(A1) transmits thecommunication to mesh router 102(A) over wireless link 110(A1). Meshrouter 102(A) routes the communication to mesh router 102(C) via meshrouter 102(B) or mesh routers 102(D) and 102(E). Mesh router 102(C) thentransmits the communication over wireless link 110(C1) to end device104(C1).

As illustrated, end device 104(C1) comprises a resource 106(C1).Although only one resource 106 is shown, multiple resources 106 may bepresent in wireless mesh network 100 at the same or different meshrouter(s) 102. Each resource 106 may be, for example, a local server orrepository of information (e.g., for a subdivision), an Internet accesspoint (ITap), a collection of multimedia data (e.g., that is of interestto a small community), and so forth.

FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary public key infrastructure (PKI) at themesh router tier in which each mesh router 102 is associated with acertificate 202. Three exemplary mesh routers 102(A), 102(B), and 102(C)are specifically shown. As illustrated, each mesh router 102 includes acertificate 202, a public key (PbK) 204, a private key (PvK) 206, and aroot key 208. Each certificate 202 includes a name 210, a signature 212,and the corresponding public key 204. Mesh router “A” 102(A) is used inparticular to describe these general aspects of the exemplary PKI at themesh router tier.

In a described implementation for mesh router 102(A), the producingentity is associated with a signing key (not shown) and root key 208that together form a public-private key pair for the producing entity.The producing entity signs certificate 202(A) with the private signingkey to create signature 212(A) by performing an operation on name-A210(A). Certificate 202(A) certifies that public key 204(A) is bound toname-A 210(A), which is the name of mesh router 102(A). Name-A 210(A)may be, for example, a serial number of mesh router 102(A).

Certificate 202(A) represents that mesh router 102(A) is a valid meshrouter 102 that is certified by the producing entity associated withroot key 208. Certificate 202(A) therefore indicates that mesh router102(A) should be allowed to join wireless mesh network 100 (of FIG. 1).In addition to certificate 202(A), mesh router 102(A) includes (e.g.,stores) public key 204(A), private key 206(A), and root key 208(A).Private key 206(A) corresponds to public key 204(A), and together theyform a public-private key pair that is associated with mesh router102(A). Root key 208(A) is a copy, which is stored at mesh router102(A), of the producing entity's root key 208.

In short, each mesh router 102 “ships” with an associated certificate202. Hence, mesh router “B” 102(B) includes a certificate 202(B), andmesh router “C” 102(C) includes a certificate 202(C). Certificate 202(B)includes name-B 210(B), signature 212(B), and public key 204(B) toindicate that mesh router 102(B) is a valid mesh router 102 from theproducing entity and that it is bound to the private key 206(B) thatcorresponds to public key 204(B). Likewise, certificate 202(C) includesname-C 210(C), signature 212(C), and public key 204(C) to indicate thatmesh router 102(C) is a valid mesh router 102 from the producing entityand that it is bound to the private key 206(C) that corresponds topublic key 204(C).

When a mesh router 102 is activated, it attempts to contact other meshrouters 102 to establish (e.g., join) a wireless mesh network 100. Whenan activated mesh router 102 contacts another mesh router 102, theactivated mesh router 102 and the other mesh router 102 perform anauthentication/key exchange protocol. The two mesh routers 102 exchangecertificates to indicate to each other that each is a valid mesh router102 from the producing entity via a signature verification procedureusing root key 208.

One or both mesh routers 102 then use the public key 204 of the other toestablish a secret symmetric key that only the activated mesh router 102and the other mesh router 102 share. The secret key may be establishedvia a key transfer procedure or a key agreement procedure. The sharedsecret key is then used to authenticate each mesh router 102 to theother. The shared secret key may also be used to ensure confidentialityof information in a communication between the two mesh routers 102.

By way of example with mesh router 102(A), after being activated, itlooks for and finds other mesh routers 102 that are in range and thatare potential neighbors. With respect to mesh router 102(B), meshrouters 102(A) and 102(B) exchange certificates 202(A) and 202(B). Aftera secret key establishment procedure, key AB 214 is created and sharedbetween mesh routers 102(A) and 102(B).

At mesh router 102(A), key AB 214(A) is stored in associationwith/mapped to mesh router “B”. These mesh router-key mappings may bestored, for example, in a data structure. At mesh router 102(B), key AB214(B) is stored in association with/mapped to mesh router “A”. Key AB214 may be used to authenticate mesh router 102(A) to mesh router102(B), and vice versa, as well as optionally to ensure confidentialityof communication contents via encryption.

Likewise, mesh routers 102(A) and 102(C) exchange certificates 202(A)and 202(C). After a secret key establishment procedure, key AC 216 iscreated and shared between mesh routers 102(A) and 102(C). Key AC 216(A)is mapped to mesh router “C” at mesh router 102(A), and key AC 216(C) ismapped to mesh router “A” at mesh router 102(C). This authentication/keyexchange protocol and key establishment procedure between mesh routers102(A) and 102(C) may occur over the mesh router network portion ofwireless mesh network 100 (e.g., via one or more mesh routers 102 suchas mesh router 102(B)) even when mesh routers 102(A) and 102(C) are notwithin wireless range of each other. Similarly, after an exchange ofcertificates 202(B) and 202(C) and a secret key establishment procedure,key BC 218 is created and shared between mesh routers 102(B) and 102(C).Key BC 218(B) is mapped to mesh router “C” at mesh router 102(B), andkey BC 218(C) is mapped to mesh router “B” at mesh router 102(C).

FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary utilization of the PKI at the meshrouter tier for the communication of a packet 302. Mesh router 102(A) istransmitting packet 302 to intended recipient mesh router 102(B). Packet302 may be received at mesh router 102(A) from another mesh router 102,from an end device 104(A), etc.; may be originally formulated at meshrouter 102(A); and so forth. Mesh router 102(A) tags packet 302 with amessage authentication code (MAC).

Because packet 302 is being sent to mesh router 102(B) from mesh router102(A), mesh router 102(A) looks up mesh router “B” in a data structure(e.g., a table) and ascertains the secret key that is shared betweenthem. In this example, the shared secret key that mesh router 102(A)retrieves is key AB 214(A). Mesh router 102(A) therefore uses key AB214(A) to create MAC-AB 302(AB). MAC-AB 302(AB) is then tagged ontopacket 302 prior to transmission. Upon reception of packet 302, meshrouter 102(B) accesses its secret key data structure at an entry formesh router “A” to retrieve the shared secret key that is mappedthereto, which is key AB 214(B). Mesh router 102(B) uses key AB 214(B)along with MAC-AB 302(AB) to authenticate that packet 302 was sent frommesh router 102(A), which is a valid and uncompromised mesh router 102.

In this example, packet 302 is ultimately destined for resource 106(C1)at end device 104(C1), which is coupled to (and may be considered partof) wireless mesh network 100 at mesh router 102(C). Mesh router 102(B),having a routing capability for wireless mesh network 100, determinesthat packet 302 is to be sent to mesh router 102(C). Mesh router 102(B)therefore ascertains that key BC 218(B) is mapped to mesh router “C” andutilizes key BC 218(B) to create MAC-BC 302(BC). MAC-BC 302(BC) istagged onto packet 302 and transmitted to mesh router 102(C). Meshrouter 102(C) uses its stored key BC 218(C) to authenticate that packet302 is received from a known and trusted mesh router 102(B).

Authentication is thusly performed on a hop-by-hop basis.Confidentiality (e.g., via encryption) of the information contents of acommunication may also be performed on a hop-by-hop basis with eachcommunication being encrypted by the shared secret key of each pair ofadjacent mesh routers 102. Alternatively, encryption may be performed onan end-to-end basis. For example, because mesh routers 102(A) and 102(C)established a shared secret key AC 216, the contents of packet 302 maybe encrypted using key AC 216. Consequently, intervening mesh routers102 such as mesh router 102(B) are not able to understand the contentsof packet 302 as it is routed through wireless mesh network 100 withend-to-end encryption.

FIG. 4 illustrates an exemplary neighborhood establishment for thewireless mesh network 100. Wireless mesh network 100 may organicallygrow unguided at an arbitrary rate and to a large, practically unboundedsize. Furthermore, there is no centralized overall network administratorto ensure that the network continues to function smoothly. Mesh routers102 are therefore empowered to establish quasi-official neighborhoods ona relatively democratic basis that appoint or designate an agreed-uponneighborhood administrator 404.

As illustrated in FIG. 4, mesh router 102(A) has also established sharedsecret key AD 402 with mesh router 102(D). Key AD 402(A) is mapped tomesh router “D” at mesh router 102(A), and key AD 402(D) is mapped tomesh router “A” at mesh router 102(D). The ellipses included in eachmesh router-to-secret key mapping data structure represent the possiblepresence of additional entries. Such additional entries may be directedto other mesh routers 102 that are illustrated in FIG. 4 and other meshrouters 102 that are not specifically included in FIG. 4.

In a described implementation, mesh router 102(C) presents or offersitself as a neighborhood administrator 404 for a number of mesh routers102 in wireless mesh network 100. Each mesh router 102 has a personaladministrator (not shown) such as the owner thereof that manages thefunctioning of the respective mesh router 102 within the confines(hopefully) of permitted capabilities originally provided and enabled bythe producing entity.

Each personal administrator of a mesh router 102 may select fordesignation a neighborhood administrator. Although not so illustrated inFIG. 4, the neighborhood administrator may not be physically located inthe neighborhood being administered; for example, the neighborhoodadministrator may actually be an internet service. Regardless ofphysical location, the neighborhood administrator is to be trusted tomanage the local neighborhood with respect to at least a subset ofmanagement decisions. This subset of management decisions includes theexclusion of a delinquent mesh router 102/certificate 202 as isdescribed further below with particular reference to FIGS. 5-7. The sizeof the local neighborhood may be bounded by a predetermined (butalterable) number of hops from the neighborhood administrator.

In the example of FIG. 4, mesh router 102(C) is an availableneighborhood administrator 404. Mesh routers 102(A), 102(B), 102(D), and102(E) each designate mesh router “C” as the neighborhood administratorat 406A, 406B, 406D, and 406E, respectively. Consequently, until theneighborhood administrator designation is revoked, mesh routers 102(A),102(B), 102(D), and 102(E) defer to mesh router 102(C) for the subset ofmanagement decisions. Optionally, each respective individual personaladministrator may further identify selected ones of the subset ofmanagement decisions to which the respective mesh router 102 is todefer.

FIG. 5 illustrates an aspect of an exemplary exclusion mechanism withrespect to a delinquent mesh router/certificate. A mesh router 102 maybe acting outside the bounds of prescribed network behavior maliciouslyand intentionally, inadvertently and accidentally, some combinationthereof, and so forth. In any case, the mesh router 102 that is engagingin proscribed network behavior may be considered delinquent.Accordingly, the certificate 202 that is associated with the delinquentmesh router 102 is also considered delinquent.

In a described implementation, delinquent behavior includes, but is notlimited to: (i) transmitting at more than an allowed rate; (ii)attempting to send more than a maximum number of allowed packets overthe mesh network in a given time period; (iii) refusing to communicatewith a valid mesh router; (iv) dropping, including not forwarding,legitimate packets; (v) launching attacks against the network; (vi) acombination thereof; and so forth. Optionally, a local neighborhoodand/or neighborhood administrator may selectively determine activitiesthat qualify as delinquent, especially from among a list promulgated bythe producing entity. A delinquent mesh router may be discovered using,for example, secure trace route, physical measurement, traffic flowmonitoring, specialized mesh management tools (e.g., statisticalanalysis), notifications from other neighborhood administrators, somecombination thereof, and so forth.

In the example illustrated in FIG. 5, mesh router 102(A) has beendiscovered to be delinquent. Consequently, mesh router 102(C) excludescertificate 202(A) (of FIG. 2) as indicated at 502(C). An exclusionindication is associated with/mapped to mesh router “A”. The exclusionindication may be included in the same data structure that stores sharedsecret keys or a different data structure.

The producing entity originally issued certificate 202(A) to indicatethe validity of mesh router 102(A) and to bind the public-private keythereof thereto. However, the exclusion of certificate 202(A) causesmesh router 102(C) (i) to consider certificate 202(A) to be invalid forwireless mesh network 100 purposes and (ii) to refuse to route trafficfrom the associated mesh router 102(A).

Mesh router 102(C) as neighborhood administrator 404 has an ability, ifnot a responsibility, to propagate the exclusion determination to meshrouters 102 in its neighborhood. Mesh router 102(C) broadcasts exclusionmessage 504 to mesh routers 102 in its neighborhood. Exclusionmessage—mesh router A 504 includes an identifier of mesh router 202(A)and/or certificate 202(A). This identifier includes, for example, name—A210(A) (of FIG. 2), all or a portion of certificate 202(A), and soforth.

As illustrated in FIG. 5, mesh routers 102(B), 102(D), and 102(E)receive exclusion message—mesh router A 504. Optionally, an exclusionmessage—mesh router A 504* may be sent to mesh router 102(A) to notifymesh router 102(A) and the personal administrator thereof of theexclusion of certificate 202(A) and the exclusion of mesh router 102(A).Exclusion message—mesh router A 504 may alternatively be sent to meshrouters 102 and/or the personal administrators thereof using someout-of-band avenue. Such avenues include e-mail, regular mail, instantmessaging, telephone calling, and so forth.

FIG. 6 illustrates another aspect of the exemplary exclusion mechanismwith respect to the delinquent mesh router 102(A)/certificate 202(A). Asdescribed above with reference to FIG. 5, each of mesh routers 102(B),102(D), and 102(E) receives exclusion message—mesh router A 504 frommesh router 102(C). In response to receiving exclusion message—meshrouter A 504, each of mesh routers 102(B), 102(D), and 102(E) associatesan exclusion indication with/maps an exclusion indication to mesh router“A” and/or certificate 202(A) at 502(B), 502(D), and 502(E),respectively.

If a shared secret key has already been established with mesh router102(A) prior to receipt of exclusion message—mesh router A 504, then theshared secret key may be disregarded in the future. For example, atexclusion indications 502(B) and 502(D), key AB 214(B) and key AD 402(D)may be rendered irrelevant. Optionally, if such keys are not to besubsequently used e.g. for tracking purposes, key AB 214(B) and key AD402(D) may be deleted.

As represented by the truncated wireless links 108AB and 108AD, meshrouter 102(A) is excluded from the neighborhood for which mesh router102(C) is the neighborhood administrator 404. For example, if meshrouter 102(B) receives a packet 302 that is tagged with MAC-AB 302(AB),mesh router 102(B) refuses to route packet 302 any further (either toanother mesh router 102 or end device 104(B1)).

If, on the other hand, a shared secret key has not already beenestablished with mesh router 102(A) prior to receipt of exclusionmessage—mesh router A 504, then the exclusion indication may be mappedto an identifier of mesh router 102(A) and/or certificate 202(A), ifprovided in the message. This identifier may be name—A 210(A) (of FIG.2) or all or part of certificate 202(A), for example. As illustrated inFIG. 6, an entry 602(E) of a data structure of mesh router 102(E) mapsan identifier of mesh router “A” to exclusion indication 502(E). If meshrouter 102(A) subsequently tries to communicate with mesh router 102(E)and offers certificate 202(A) as an indication of validity andtrustworthiness, mesh router 102(E) refuses to perform anauthentication/key exchange protocol with mesh router 102(A).

FIG. 7 is a flow diagram 700 that illustrates an exemplary method forimplementing an exclusion capability in a wireless mesh network. Flowdiagram 700 includes six (6) blocks 702-712. Although the actions ofblocks 702-712 may be performed in other implementations andenvironments, FIGS. 2-6 are used in particular to illuminate certainaspects of the method. For example, flow diagram 700 is divided into twoparts: mesh router “C” 102(C) and mesh router “B” 102(B). Asillustrated, mesh router “C” 102(C) performs the actions of three (3)blocks 702-706, and mesh router “B” 102(B) performs the actions of three(3) blocks 708-712.

At block 702, neighborhood administrator status is established. Forexample, mesh router “C” 102(C) may offer to be a neighborhoodadministrator 404, and at least one other mesh router 102 designatesmesh router “C” 102(C) as the neighborhood administrator 404. An ownerof a valued resource 106, for instance, may offer its mesh router 102 asa neighborhood administrator 404.

At block 704, a delinquent mesh router is detected. For example, it maybe detected that mesh router 102(A) is delinquent through one or more ofthe above-described mechanisms. At block 706, neighborhood mesh routersare notified of the delinquent mesh router.

For example, mesh router “C” 102(C) may broadcast an exclusionmessage—mesh router A 504 that identifies mesh router 102(A), such as byincluding certificate 202(A) in the message. Exclusion message—meshrouter A 504 may be sent over wireless mesh network 100 or through someout-of-band avenue.

With respect to mesh router “B” 102(B), a neighborhood administrator isdesignated by the mesh router at block 708. For example, mesh router “B”102(B) may designate mesh router “C” 102(C) as its designatedneighborhood administrator 406B. The communication exchange thateffectuates this designation informs mesh router “C” 102(C) that meshrouter “B” 102(B) has joined its neighborhood. As a result, exclusionnotifications that are provided (e.g., transmitted) by mesh router “C”102(C) are targeted to mesh router “B” 102(B).

At block 710, the mesh router receives notification of a delinquent meshrouter from the designated neighborhood administrator. For example, meshrouter “B” 102(B) may receive exclusion message—mesh router A 504, whichidentifies certificate 202(A) of mesh router 102(A), from mesh router“C” 102(C). The exclusion message—mesh router A 504 may be signed bymesh router “C” 102(C) so that mesh router “B” 102(B) can authenticatethat the exclusion notification originated from its designatedneighborhood administrator 404.

At block 712, the mesh router excludes the identified delinquent meshrouter based on the certificate that is associated with the identifieddelinquent mesh router. For example, mesh router “B” 102(B) may refuseto communicate with mesh router 102(A), including refusing to forward orotherwise route packets that are authenticated with certificate 202(A)or a secret key established therewith.

Certificate 202(A) is issued for mesh router 102(A) by the producingentity of mesh routers 102. Mesh router 102(C) notifies mesh router102(B) of the exclusion status of certificate 202(A). Mesh router 102(B)consequently excludes certificate 202(A) based on this notification.This exclusion affects mesh router 102(A) or any mesh router 102attempting to present certificate 202(A) as an indication of validityand trustworthiness. Thus, mesh router 102(B) effectively treatscertificate 202(A) as being revoked and/or invalid based on notificationfrom a non-issuing entity, namely mesh router 102(C), that has beendesignated by mesh router 102(B) to have this exclusion authority.

FIG. 8 illustrates an aspect of an exemplary recognition mechanism withrespect to an end device 104(B1). End device 104(B1) is in communicationwith mesh router 102(B) over wireless link 110(B1). The exemplaryrecognition mechanism enables end device 104(B1) to be speciallyrecognized by multiple mesh routers 102 within a given neighborhood. Forexample, end device 104(B1) is affiliated with mesh router 102(B), whichis a member of the neighborhood of mesh router 102(C). When end device104(B1) moves to another mesh router 102, such as mesh router 102(E),that is part of the same neighborhood, the other mesh router 102recognizes end device 104(B1) as a privileged end device 104. Thismovement to and recognition by mesh router 102(E) is specificallydescribed further below with reference to FIG. 9.

As shown in FIG. 8, mesh router 102(E) is explicitly illustrated asincluding a certificate 202(E). Certificate 202(E) includes name-E210(E), a signature 212(E), and public key 204(E). Public key 204(E)corresponds to a private key 206(E) (not explicitly shown) of meshrouter 102(E). Certificates 202 are described generally above withparticular reference to FIG. 2. End device 104(B1) is illustrated asincluding a certificate 202(B1) and (a copy of) certificate 202(B).

In a described implementation, mesh router 102(C) is the establishedneighborhood administrator 404 for a given neighborhood. Theneighborhood of mesh router 102(C) includes mesh router 102(B), meshrouter 102(E), mesh router 102(D) (e.g., of FIGS. 1, 4, and 5), meshrouter 102(A) (e.g., if not excluded), and possibly other mesh routers102 that are not specifically illustrated. Mesh routers 102 of theneighborhood of mesh router 102(C) have designated mesh router “C” astheir neighborhood administrator at 406.

Forming a neighborhood is one approach to enabling implementation of theabove-described exclusion capability. Neighborhood formation alsoenables another kind of cooperation between and among mesh routers 102of a given neighborhood. For example, privileged access may be given bymesh routers 102 to end devices 104 that are affiliated with other meshrouters 102 of the same neighborhood.

In a described implementation, end devices 104 are granted access towireless mesh network 100 (e.g., of FIG. 1) at differentprivilege/priority levels. For example, end devices 104 may be grantedstandard access or preferred access. A default access scenario enablesany end device 104 to access wireless mesh network 100 at the standardaccess level. An elevated access scenario enables end devices 104 thatare affiliated with a particular mesh router 102 of a given neighborhoodto access any mesh router 102 of the given neighborhood at the preferredaccess level. Evidence of the affiliation of an end device 104 with aparticular mesh router 102 of a given neighborhood is provided, at leastpartially, using the PKI of the mesh router tier.

End device 104(B1) is affiliated with mesh router 102(B). For example, apersonal administrator of mesh router 102(B) may know or actually be theowner of end device 104(B1). Accordingly, the personal administrator maywant end device 104(B1) to be entitled to preferred access to wirelessmesh network 100 at least through mesh router 102(B). To provide enddevice 104(B1) with evidence of this affiliation, mesh router 102(B)issues a certificate 202(B1) that is signed by certificate 202(B) to enddevice 104(B1).

In other words, end device 104(B1) is issued and associated withcertificate 202(B1) as signed by certificate 202(B). Hence, a name ofcertificate 202(B1) identifies end device 104(B1). A public key ofcertificate 202(B1) corresponds to a private key, with the resultingpublic-private key pair being associated with end device 104(B1). Asignature of certificate 202(B1) is produced by a private key operationusing private key 206(B) (of FIG. 2) of mesh router 102(B). End device104(B1) can use certificate 202(B1) along with certificate 202(B) todemonstrate to mesh router 102(B) that it is affiliated therewith.

Certificates issued to end devices 104, such as certificate 202(B1), maybe issued with an expiration date because they are likely less securethan certificates issued to mesh routers 102, such as mesh router102(B), by the producing entity. Mesh router 102(B) may also delegatecertificate-issuing authority to end device 104(B1). End device 104(B1)can subsequently issue additional certificates 202 to other end devices104 to create a certificate chain. The certificate chain may be used fordemonstrating end device 104 affiliation and securing recognition fromnon-affiliated mesh routers 102.

If a personal administrator of a given mesh router 102 learns that aparticular end device certificate 202 issued by its given mesh router102 is suspect (e.g., because the associated end device 104 iscompromised), the personal administrator or given mesh router 102thereof requests that the suspect end device certificate 202 beexcluded. This request is made to the neighborhood administrator 404,which can then broadcast an exclusion notification message thatidentifies the suspect end device certificate 202.

End device 104(B1) can use certificate 202(B1) along with certificate202(B) to demonstrate that it is also entitled to preferred access withnon-affiliated mesh routers 102 that are in the neighborhood of meshrouter 102(C). This may occur, for example, if mesh router 102(B) isnon-functional and/or if end device 104(B1) moves out of range of meshrouter 102(B). For instance, end device 104(B1) may move into range ofmesh router 102(E).

FIG. 9 illustrates another aspect of the exemplary recognition mechanismwith respect to end device 104(B1). As compared to FIG. 8, end device104(B1) has moved into range of mesh router 102(E). End device 104(B1)is in communication with mesh router 102(E) over a wireless link110(E/B1). The exemplary recognition mechanism enables end device104(B1) to be specially recognized by mesh router 102(E) as being partof the neighborhood of mesh router 102(C).

Mesh router 102(E) includes a data structure 902 that lists orenumerates mesh routers 102 that are neighborhood members. In thisexample, the enumerated neighborhood members are those mesh routers 102that have designated mesh router 102(C) as their neighborhoodadministrator at 406B, 406E, etc. Data structure 902 lists mesh router“B” [102(B)]; mesh router “C” [102(C)], which may be identified as theneighborhood administrator (NA); mesh router “D” [102(D)]; and so forth.

Data structure 902 may be part of and/or include other data structures,such as those data structures that store shared secret keys, those thatstore exclusion indications, and so forth. Although not so illustratedin FIG. 9, each mesh router 102 that is part of the neighborhood of meshrouter 102(C) (e.g., mesh router 102(B)) also includes a data structurethat is analogous to data structure 902.

In operation, end device 104(B1) and mesh router 102(E) set up wirelesslink 110(E/B1) therebetween. End device 104(B1) provides mesh router102(E) with certificate 202(B) and certificate 202(B1). Based oncertificate 202(B), mesh router 102(E) accesses data structure 902 toascertain if the named mesh router, mesh router 102(B), is a member ofthe neighborhood of mesh router 102(C) to which mesh router 102(E)belongs. If data structure 902 includes mesh routers 102 that have beenexcluded, then mesh router 102(E) also checks to ensure that mesh router102(B) has not been excluded.

Because mesh router 102(B) is a member of the neighborhood of meshrouter 102(C) and is thus listed in neighborhood members data structure902, mesh router 102(E) analyzes certificate 202(B). If mesh router102(E) and mesh router 102(B) have previously performed a certificateexchange/key establishment procedure and if mesh router 102(E) stored acopy of certificate 202(B), mesh router 102(E) may merely compare thestored copy of certificate 202(B) to the copy of certificate 202(B)provided by end device 104(B1) to ensure the legitimacy of certificate202(B). If not, then mesh router 102(E) performs a signatureverification procedure on certificate 202(B) using its stored root key208(E) (not explicitly illustrated) to validate certificate 202(B).

After mesh router 102(E) ascertains that mesh router 102(B) is a memberof the same neighborhood and that the presented certificate 202(B) islegitimate/valid, mesh router 102(E) analyzes certificate 202(B1).Certificate 202(B1) is analyzed to ensure that certificate 202(B1) wasissued by the mesh router 102(B) that is associated with certificate202(B). Thus, mesh router 102(E) uses public key 204(B) of certificate202(B) to perform a signature verification procedure on the signature ofcertificate 202(B1) to verify that the signature of certificate 202(B1)was signed by the corresponding private key 206(B) of neighborhoodmember mesh router 102(B).

If this signature verification procedure is successful, then mesh router102(E) has determined that certificate 202(B1) is valid and that enddevice 104(B1) is affiliated with mesh router 102(B), which is aneighborhood member of the neighborhood of mesh router 102(C).Consequently, mesh router 102(E) grants end device 104(B1) preferredaccess instead of standard access. Mesh router 102(E) and end device104(B1) may also perform a key establishment procedure to establish ashared secret key for authenticating/encrypting communications betweenthe two nodes.

Privileged status relates to level of service such as being entitled topreferred access instead of merely standard access. Preferred accessversus standard access may respectively comprise a faster data rateversus a slower data rate, a guaranteed throughput versus a best effortthroughput, a higher priority for transmission/reception versus a lowerpriority for transmission/reception, some combination thereof, and soforth. Levels of service may also include more than two different levelsof service/status.

It should be noted that preferred access versus standard access (or agreater number of different levels of service) for communicated trafficmay be honored throughout wireless mesh network 100 by tagging traffic.For example, routers 102 can tag their transmitted packets by theirindividually determined classification (e.g., as “standard access rate”or “preferred access rate”). As a result, differences in packetclassification can be respected throughout wireless mesh network 100,instead of merely at the router 102 where an end device 104 introducesthe packets into wireless mesh network 100 and where the classificationdetermination is made.

This exemplary recognition mechanism therefore enables an end device104(B1) that is affiliated with a particular mesh router 102(B) to bespecially recognized by other mesh routers 102 that are members of thesame neighborhood, which is administered by mesh router 102(C). As aresult, peers (e.g., mesh routers 102) of a first tier can issuecertificates 202 hierarchically to a second different tier (e.g., to enddevices 104) that are recognized by other peers of the first tier.

FIG. 10 is a flow diagram 1000 that illustrates an exemplary method forimplementing end device recognition in a wireless mesh network. Flowdiagram 1000 includes ten (10) blocks 1002-1020. Although the actions ofblocks 1002-1020 may be performed in other implementations andenvironments, FIGS. 2, 8, and 9 are used in particular to illuminatecertain aspects of the method. For example, flow diagram 1000 is dividedinto three parts: mesh router “B” 102(B), end device 104(B1) of meshrouter “B”, and mesh router “E” 102(E). As illustrated, mesh router “B”102(B) performs the action(s) of block 1002, end device 104(B1) of meshrouter “B” performs the actions of five (5) blocks 1004-1012, and meshrouter “E” 102(E) performs the actions of four (4) blocks 1014-1020.

At block 1004, an end device connects with an affiliated mesh router.For example, end device 104(B1) may connect with mesh router 102(B) overwireless link 110(B1). End device 104(B1) may be affiliated with meshrouter 102(B) if the personal administrator of mesh router 102(B) knowsor otherwise trusts the owner/operator of end device 104(B1).

At block 1002, the affiliated mesh router issues an end devicecertificate, which is signed by the mesh router certificate of theaffiliated mesh router, to the end device. For example, mesh router102(B) may use its associated certificate 202(B) to sign a certificate202(B1) that is issued to end device 104(B1). Both of the certificates,certificate 202(B) and certificate 202(B1), may be provided via wirelesslink 110(B1) from mesh router 102(B) to end device 104(B1).

At block 1006, the end device certificate and the mesh routercertificate are stored by the end device. For example, certificate202(B1) and certificate 202(B) may be stored by end device 104(B1). Atblock 1008, the end device moves to a new location. For example, afterdisconnecting from mesh router 102(B), end device 104(B1) may move frombeing within range of mesh router 102(B) to being within range of meshrouter 102(E). As indicated by the asterisk(*), this is an optionalaction inasmuch as end device 104(B1) may be within range of, andcapable of wirelessly communicating with, both of mesh routers 102(B)and 102(E) from a single location.

At block 1010, the end device connects with a neighborhood (butnon-affiliated) mesh router. For example, end device 104(B1) may connectwith mesh router 102(E) over wireless link 110(E/B1). Mesh router 102(E)is a member of the same neighborhood as that of mesh router 102(B), towhich end device 104(B1) is affiliated. In other words, both of meshrouter 102(B) and mesh router 102(E) have designated the sameneighborhood administrator 404 in mesh router 102(C).

At block 1012, the end device provides both the end device certificateand the mesh router certificate that was used to sign the end devicecertificate to the non-affiliated neighborhood mesh router. For example,end device 104(B1) may provide certificate 202(B1) and certificate202(B) to mesh router 102(E). Alternatively, if mesh router 102(E) hasstored a copy of an associated certificate 202 for each mesh router 102in its neighborhood, end device 104(B1) may merely send certificate202(B1) and an identifier of mesh router 102(B), which identifier may beincluded in certificate 202(B1), to mesh router 102(E).

At block 1014, the neighborhood mesh router ascertains if the meshrouter associated with the mesh router certificate is a neighborhoodmember. For example, mesh router 102(E) may access a neighborhoodmembers data structure 902 to ascertain if there is an entry thereofthat is directed to/includes mesh router 102(B). If not, then at block1020 the neighborhood mesh router grants the end device standard access.For example, mesh router 102(E) may grant standard access to end device104(B1).

If, on the other hand, the neighborhood mesh router does ascertain thatthe mesh router associated with the mesh router certificate is aneighborhood member (at block 1014), then the method continues at block1016. At block 1016, the neighborhood mesh router determines whether theend device certificate is valid. For example, mesh router 102(E) mayanalyze certificate 202(B1), possibly in conjunction with an analysis ofcertificate 202(B), to determine whether certificate 202(B1) was issuedby a private key 206(B) of a legitimate mesh router 102(B). Thisanalysis may involve at least one public key 204(B) operation for asignature verification procedure on a signature of certificate 202(B1).

If it is not determined that the end device certificate is valid (atblock 1016), then standard access is granted to the end device by theneighborhood mesh router at block 1020. If, on the other hand, theneighborhood mesh router does determine that the end device certificateis valid (at block 1016), then the method continues at block 1018. Atblock 1018, the neighborhood mesh router grants preferred access to theend device. For example, mesh router 102(E) may grant preferred accessto end device 104(B1). This exemplary method thus implements end devicerecognition in a wireless mesh network such that an end device mayreceive privileged access from a non-affiliated mesh router that is amember of the same neighborhood as the mesh router to which the enddevice is affiliated.

FIG. 11 illustrates another exemplary recognition mechanism with respectto an end device 104(B1) that is engaged in inter-neighborhood movement.End device 104(B1) may move from a first neighborhood, which has as amember its affiliated mesh router 102(B), to a second neighborhood. Withthis other exemplary recognition mechanism as shown in FIG. 11, enddevice 104(B1) may be specially recognized by mesh routers 102 that aremembers of the second neighborhood.

As illustrated, mesh router “C” 102(C) is indicated at 404C as aneighborhood administrator for a first neighborhood. Mesh router 102(B)is a member of the first neighborhood of mesh router 102(C). A meshrouter “G” 102(G) is indicated at 404G as a neighborhood administratorfor another second neighborhood. A mesh router 102(F) is a member of thesecond neighborhood of mesh router 102(G). Mesh router 102(F) hasdesignated mesh router “G” as neighborhood administrator at 406F. Meshrouter 102(F) is associated with a certificate 202(F), and mesh router102(G) is associated with a certificate 202(G).

In a described implementation, neighborhood administrators 404C and 404Gfor mesh routers 102(C) and 102(G), respectively, have agreed toreciprocity recognition 1102. In other words, each of mesh router 102(C)and mesh router 102(G) have agreed to specially recognize end devices104 that are affiliated with each other's member mesh routers 102.Alternatively, the recognition agreement may be unilateral instead ofreciprocal and bilateral.

Mesh router 102(G) is in communication with mesh router 102(F) overwireless link 108FG. Over wireless link 108FG mesh router 102(G) sends atrust mesh router “C” message 1104 to mesh router 102(F). In otherwords, mesh router 102(G) is asserting that mesh router 102(C) operatesa good and/or trustworthy neighborhood. Mesh router 102(G) is alsoinstructing mesh router 102(F) to specially recognize end devices 104that are affiliated with mesh routers 102 of the neighborhood of meshrouter 102(C) in order to fulfill obligations of being a proper meshrouter 102 in the neighborhood of mesh router 102(G).

Mesh router 102(F) includes a data structure 1106 that lists orenumerates neighborhood administrators that are to be trusted.Responsive to the trust mesh router “C” message 1104, mesh router 102(F)adds an entry that includes/identifies mesh router “C” [102(C)]. Datastructure 1106 may also include additional entries as indicated by theellipses. Furthermore, trusted neighborhood administrators datastructure 1106 may also be combined with other data structures,including those described otherwise herein. Although not so illustratedin FIG. 11, mesh router 102(B) also includes an analogous trustedneighborhood administrators data structure 1106 that enumerates meshrouter “G” [102(G)] when recognition agreement 1102 is reciprocal.

In a described implementation, at time T=X, end device 104(B1) is incommunication with mesh router 102(B) over wireless link 110(B1). Enddevice 104(B1) is associated with and includes certificate 202(B1) assigned by certificate 202(B), which is also stored by end device104(B1). Mesh router 102(B) also provides end device 104(B1) with amembership certificate 202(CB) that is signed by certificate 202(C).Membership certificate 202(CB) and certificate 202(C) are provided tomesh router 102(B) from mesh router 102(C).

Digital certificates can also be used to certify that an entity has aparticular attribute(s). Certificates that represent that an entity hasa certain attribute are called attribute certificates. When theattribute is membership, the attribute certificate may be termed amembership certificate. Membership certificate 202(CB) represents thatmesh router 102(B) is a member of the neighborhood of mesh router102(C). Membership certificate 202(CB) is signed with certificate 202(C)by mesh router 102(C), which is neighborhood administrator 404C.

At time T=X+1, end device 104(B1) moves from being in range of meshrouter 102(B) of the neighborhood of mesh router 102(C) to being inrange of mesh router 102(F) of the neighborhood of mesh router 102(G).Mesh router 102(F) and end device 104(B1) establish a connection overwireless link 110(F/B1). Over wireless link 110(F/B1), end device104(B1) transmits certificate 202(B1), certificate 202(B), membershipcertificate 202(CB), and certificate 202(C) to mesh router 102(F). In analternative implementation, membership certificate 202(CB) and/orcertificate 202(C) may be provided to mesh router 102(F) from meshrouter 102(G).

Mesh router 102(F) uses certificate 202(B1) and certificate 202(B) toensure that end device 104(B1) is a valid mesh router 102 that is infact affiliated with mesh router 102(B) via signature verificationprocedures. Mesh router 102(F) uses membership certificate 202(CB) andcertificate 202(C) to ensure that mesh router 102(B) is in fact a memberof the neighborhood of mesh router 102(C).

After accessing trusted neighborhood administrators data structure 1106and locating an entry including/directed to mesh router “C” [102(C)],mesh router 102(F) determines that end devices 104 that are affiliatedwith mesh routers 102 that are members of the neighborhood of meshrouter 102(C) are to be granted specialized recognition. Accordingly,mesh router 102(F) grants end device 104(B1) special recognition. Forexample, end device 104(B1) may be entitled to preferred access status.

With reference to FIGS. 8-10, it should be noted that attributecertificates 202 may also be used with intra-neighborhood movementimplementations in lieu of a neighborhood members data structure 902approach. For example in such an implementation for the movement of FIG.9, end device 104(B1) sends mesh router 102(E) a membership attributecertificate 202(CB) (and possibly certificate 202(C)) in addition tocertificate 202(B1) and certificate 202(B). Mesh router 102(E) thenanalyzes the certificates 202 instead of accessing (or storing) datastructure 902.

The routers, devices, actions, aspects, features, components, etc. ofFIGS. 1-11 are illustrated in diagrams that are divided into multipleblocks. However, the order, interconnections, interrelationships,layout, etc. in which FIGS. 1-11 are described and/or shown is notintended to be construed as a limitation, and any number of the blockscan be modified, combined, rearranged, augmented, omitted, etc. in anymanner to implement one or more systems, methods, devices, procedures,media, application programming interfaces (APIs), apparatuses,arrangements, etc. for mesh network implementations. Furthermore,although the description herein includes references to specificimplementations (and the exemplary operating environment of FIG. 12below), the illustrated and/or described implementations can beimplemented in any suitable hardware, software, firmware, or combinationthereof and using any suitable device architecture(s), codingparadigm(s), communication avenue(s), wireless air interface scheme(s),and so forth.

FIG. 12 illustrates an exemplary computing (or general device) operatingenvironment 1200 that is capable of (fully or partially) implementing atleast one system, router, device, apparatus, component, arrangement,protocol, approach, method, procedure, media, API, some combinationthereof, etc. for mesh network implementations as described herein.Operating environment 1200 may be utilized in the computer and networkarchitectures described below.

Exemplary operating environment 1200 is only one example of anenvironment and is not intended to suggest any limitation as to thescope of use or functionality of the applicable device (includingcomputer, network node such as, a router or end device, entertainmentdevice, mobile appliance, general electronic device, etc.)architectures. Neither should operating environment 1200 (or the devicesthereof) be interpreted as having any dependency or requirement relatingto any one or to any combination of components as illustrated in FIG.12.

Additionally, mesh network implementations may be realized with numerousother general purpose or special purpose device (including computing orwireless system) environments or configurations. Examples of well knowndevices, systems, environments, and/or configurations that may besuitable for use include, but are not limited to, personal computers,server computers, thin clients, thick clients, personal digitalassistants (PDAs) or mobile telephones, watches, hand-held or laptopdevices, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based systems, set-topboxes, programmable consumer electronics, video game machines, gameconsoles, portable or handheld gaming units, network PCs, minicomputers,mainframe computers, wired or wireless network nodes (including generalor specialized routers), distributed or multi-processing computingenvironments that include any of the above systems or devices, somecombination thereof, and so forth.

Realizations for mesh network implementations may be described in thegeneral context of processor-executable instructions. Generally,processor-executable instructions include routines, programs, modules,protocols, objects, interfaces, components, data structures, etc. thatperform and/or enable particular tasks and/or implement particularabstract data types. Mesh network implementations, as described incertain embodiments herein, may also be practiced in distributedprocessing environments where tasks are performed by remotely-linkedprocessing devices that are connected through a communications linkand/or network. Especially but not exclusively in a distributedcomputing environment, processor-executable instructions may be locatedin separate storage media, executed by different processors, and/orpropagated over transmission media.

Exemplary operating environment 1200 includes a general-purposecomputing device in the form of a computer 1202, which may comprise any(e.g., electronic) device with computing/processing capabilities. Thecomponents of computer 1202 may include, but are not limited to, one ormore processors or processing units 1204, a system memory 1206, and asystem bus 1208 that couples various system components includingprocessor 1204 to system memory 1206.

Processors 1204 are not limited by the materials from which they areformed or the processing mechanisms employed therein. For example,processors 1204 may be comprised of semiconductor(s) and/or transistors(e.g., electronic integrated circuits (ICs)). In such a context,processor-executable instructions may be electronically-executableinstructions. Alternatively, the mechanisms of or for processors 1204,and thus of or for computer 1202, may include, but are not limited to,quantum computing, optical computing, mechanical computing (e.g., usingnanotechnology), and so forth.

System bus 1208 represents one or more of any of many types of wired orwireless bus structures, including a memory bus or memory controller, apoint-to-point connection, a switching fabric, a peripheral bus, anaccelerated graphics port, and a processor or local bus using any of avariety of bus architectures. By way of example, such architectures mayinclude an Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, a Micro ChannelArchitecture (MCA) bus, an Enhanced ISA (EISA) bus, a Video ElectronicsStandards Association (VESA) local bus, a Peripheral ComponentInterconnects (PCI) bus also known as a Mezzanine bus, some combinationthereof, and so forth.

Computer 1202 typically includes a variety of processor-accessiblemedia. Such media may be any available media that is accessible bycomputer 1202 or another (e.g., electronic) device, and it includes bothvolatile and non-volatile media, removable and non-removable media, andstorage and transmission media.

System memory 1206 includes processor-accessible storage media in theform of volatile memory, such as random access memory (RAM) 1210, and/ornon-volatile memory, such as read only memory (ROM) 1212. A basicinput/output system (BIOS) 1214, containing the basic routines that helpto transfer information between elements within computer 1202, such asduring start-up, is typically stored in ROM 1212. RAM 1210 typicallycontains data and/or program modules/instructions that are immediatelyaccessible to and/or being presently operated on by processing unit1204.

Computer 1202 may also include other removable/non-removable and/orvolatile/non-volatile storage media. By way of example, FIG. 12illustrates a hard disk drive or disk drive array 1216 for reading fromand writing to a (typically) non-removable, non-volatile magnetic media(not separately shown); a magnetic disk drive 1218 for reading from andwriting to a (typically) removable, non-volatile magnetic disk 1220(e.g., a “floppy disk”); and an optical disk drive 1222 for reading fromand/or writing to a (typically) removable, non-volatile optical disk1224 such as a CD, DVD, or other optical media. Hard disk drive 1216,magnetic disk drive 1218, and optical disk drive 1222 are each connectedto system bus 1208 by one or more storage media interfaces 1226.Alternatively, 11 hard disk drive 1216, magnetic disk drive 1218, andoptical disk drive 1222 may be connected to system bus 1208 by one ormore other separate or combined interfaces (not shown).

The disk drives and their associated processor-accessible media providenon-volatile storage of processor-executable instructions, such as datastructures, program modules, and other data for computer 1202. Althoughexemplary computer 1202 illustrates a hard disk 1216, a removablemagnetic disk 1220, and a removable optical disk 1224, it is to beappreciated that other types of processor-accessible media may storeinstructions that are accessible by a device, such as magnetic cassettesor other magnetic storage devices, flash memory, compact disks (CDs),digital versatile disks (DVDs) or other optical storage, RAM, ROM,electrically-erasable programmable read-only memories (EEPROM), and soforth. Such media may also include so-called special purpose orhard-wired IC chips. In other words, any processor-accessible media maybe utilized to realize the storage media of the exemplary operatingenvironment 1200.

Any number of program modules (or other units or sets ofinstructions/code) may be stored on hard disk 1216, magnetic disk 1220,optical disk 1224, ROM 1212, and/or RAM 1210, including by way ofgeneral example, an operating system 1228, one or more applicationprograms 1230, other program modules 1232, and program data 1234. Suchinstructions may include module(s) for joining and participating in awireless mesh network, module(s) for implementing exclusion mechanisms,module(s) for extending the PKI onto the end device tier, mapping datastructure(s), and so forth.

A user may enter commands and/or information into computer 1202 viainput devices such as a keyboard 1236 and a pointing device 1238 (e.g.,a “mouse”). Other input devices 1240 (not shown specifically) mayinclude a microphone, joystick, game pad, satellite dish, serial port,scanner, and/or the like. These and other input devices are connected toprocessing unit 1204 via input/output interfaces 1242 that are coupledto system bus 1208. However, input devices and/or output devices mayinstead be connected by other interface and bus structures, such as aparallel port, a game port, a universal serial bus (USB) port, aninfrared port, an IEEE 1394 (“Firewire”) interface, an IEEE 802.11 orother general wireless interface, a Bluetooth® wireless interface, andso forth.

A monitor/view screen 1244 or other type of display device may also beconnected to system bus 1208 via an interface, such as a video adapter1246. Video adapter 1246 (or another component) may be or may include agraphics card for processing graphics-intensive calculations and forhandling demanding display requirements. Typically, a graphics cardincludes a graphics processing unit (GPU), video RAM (VRAM), etc. tofacilitate the expeditious display of graphics and the performance ofgraphics operations. In addition to monitor 1244, other outputperipheral devices may include components such as speakers (not shown)and a printer 1248, which may be connected to computer 1202 viainput/output interfaces 1242.

Computer 1202 may operate in a networked environment using logicalconnections to one or more remote computers, such as a remote computingdevice 1250. By way of example, remote computing device 1250 may be apersonal computer, a portable computer (e.g., laptop computer, tabletcomputer, PDA, mobile station, etc.), a palm or pocket-sized computer, awatch, a gaming device, a server, a router, a network computer, a peerdevice, another network node, or another device type as listed above,and so forth. However, remote computing device 1250 is illustrated as aportable computer that may include many or all of the elements andfeatures described herein with respect to computer 1202.

Logical connections between computer 1202 and remote computer 1250 aredepicted as a local area network (LAN) 1252 and a general wide areanetwork (WAN) 1254. Such networking environments are commonplace inoffices, enterprise-wide computer networks, intranets, the Internet,fixed and mobile telephone networks, ad-hoc and infrastructure wirelessnetworks, other wireless networks, gaming networks, some combinationthereof, and so forth. Such networks and communications connections areexamples of transmission media.

When implemented in a LAN networking environment, computer 1202 isusually connected to LAN 1252 via a network interface or adapter 1256.When implemented in a WAN networking environment, computer 1202typically includes a modem 1258 or other component for establishingcommunications over WAN 1254. Modem 1258, which may be internal orexternal to computer 1202, may be connected to system bus 1208 viainput/output interfaces 1242 or any other appropriate mechanism(s). Itis to be appreciated that the illustrated network connections areexemplary and that other manners for establishing communication link(s),including wireless link(s), between computers 1202 and 1250 may beemployed.

In a networked environment, such as that illustrated with operatingenvironment 1200, program modules or other instructions that aredepicted relative to computer 1202, or portions thereof, may be fully orpartially stored in a remote media storage device. By way of example,remote application programs 1260 reside on a memory component of remotecomputer 1250 but may be usable or otherwise accessible via computer1202. Also, for purposes of illustration, application programs 1230 andother processor-executable instructions such as operating system 1228are illustrated herein as discrete blocks, but it is recognized thatsuch programs, components, and other instructions reside at varioustimes in different storage components of computing device 1202 (and/orremote computing device 1250) and are executed by processor(s) 1204 ofcomputer 1202 (and/or those of remote computing device 1250).

Although systems, media, routers, devices, methods, procedures,apparatuses, techniques, APIs, schemes, approaches, procedures,arrangements, and other implementations have been described in languagespecific to structural, logical, algorithmic, and functional featuresand/or diagrams, it is to be understood that the invention defined inthe appended claims is not necessarily limited to the specific featuresor diagrams described. Rather, the specific features and diagrams aredisclosed as exemplary forms of implementing the claimed invention.

1. A mesh router comprising: at least one processor; a network interfaceconfigured to communicatively couple the mesh router with one or moreother mesh routers on a network; and one or more media configured tostore a mesh-router- producing-entity-issued certificate of a pluralityof certificates issued by a mesh-router-producing entity, the storedcertificate comprising a name, a signature, and a public key, whereinthe name corresponds to a name of the mesh router, the signaturecorresponds to an authentication by the mesh-router- -producing entity,and the public key certifying that themesh-router-producing-entity-issued certificate is bound to the name ofthe mesh router and configured to store processor-executableinstructions capable of being executed by the at least one processor,the processor-executable instructions configured to direct the router toperform actions comprising: initializing by designating the mesh routerto be a single neighborhood administrator, the designated neighborhoodadministrator offering to be the neighborhood administrator and beingdesignated by at least one other mesh router of the one or more othermesh routers on a network, granting, by the designated neighborhoodadministrator, access to the network to mesh routers that possess atleast one of the plurality of certificates issued by themesh-router-producing entity; detecting a delinquent mesh router of theone or more mesh routers of the network and deciding whether to excludea delinquent mesh router certificate associated with the delinquent meshrouter, the delinquent mesh router certificate comprising a name of thedelinquent mesh router, a signature created by a producing entity, and apublic key corresponding to the delinquent mesh router; receiving thedelinquent mesh router certificate and notification of the associateddelinquent mesh router from the designated neighborhood administrator,the notification being signed by the designated neighborhoodadministrator to authenticate the notification; and excluding thedelinquent mesh router responsive to the authenticated notificationbased on the associated delinquent mesh router certificate; wherein therouter comprises a mesh router that effectively treats the associateddelinquent mesh router certificate as being revoked and/or invalid basedon the authenticated notification from the designated neighborhoodadministrator even when the associated delinquent mesh routercertificate is issued and authenticated by an entity other than thedesignated neighborhood administrator.
 2. The mesh router as recited inclaim 1, wherein the mesh router further comprises: a wirelesstransceiver that enables wireless communication with end devices and/orother routers.
 3. The mesh router as recited in claim 1, wherein themesh router is associated with a certificate; and wherein thecertificate associated with the mesh router and the associateddelinquent certificate of the delinquent mesh router are both signed bya producing entity.
 4. The mesh router as recited in claim 1, whereinthe one or more media further include a data structure; and wherein theprocessor-executable instructions are configured to direct the router toperform a further action comprising: mapping an exclusion indication inthe data structure to at least one of (i) the associated delinquentcertificate and (ii) an identifier of the delinquent router.
 5. The meshrouter as recited in claim 4, wherein the data structure further mapsrespective shared secret keys to respective routers.
 6. A method forimplementing an exclusion capability, the method comprising:communicatively coupling a mesh router with one or more other meshrouters on a network; storing a mesh-router-producing-entity-issuedcertificate of a plurality of certificates issued by a mesh-routerproducing entity, the stored certificate comprising a name, a signature,and a public key, wherein the name corresponds to a name of the meshrouter, the signature corresponds to an authentication by themesh-router-producing entity, and the public key certifying that themesh-router-producing-entity-issued certificate is bound to the name ofthe mesh router and configured to store processor-executableinstructions capable of being executed by at least one processor;initializing by designating by at least one other mesh router a singledesignated neighborhood administrator amongst a plurality of meshrouters of a network; granting, by the designated neighborhoodadministrator, access to the network to mesh routers that possess atleast one of the plurality of certificates issued by themesh-router-producing entity; detecting a delinquent mesh router of theone or more mesh routers of the network and deciding whether to excludea delinquent mesh router certificate associated with the delinquent meshrouter, the delinquent mesh router certificate comprising a name of thedelinquent mesh router, a signature created by a producing entity, and apublic key corresponding to the delinquent mesh router; receiving thedelinquent mesh router certificate and a notification of the associateddelinquent mesh router from the designated neighborhood administrator,the notification being signed by the designated neighborhoodadministrator to authenticate the notification; and excluding thedelinquent mesh router responsive to the authenticated notificationbased on the associated delinquent mesh router certificate; wherein thereceiving comprises receiving an identification of a certificate that isassociated with the delinquent mesh router, the certificate comprising aname of the delinquent mesh router, a signature created by a producingentity, and a public key corresponding to the delinquent mesh router andfurther wherein the router comprises a mesh router that effectivelytreats the associated delinquent mesh router certificate as beingrevoked and/or invalid based on the authenticated notification from thedesignated neighborhood administrator even when the associateddelinquent mesh router certificate is issued and authenticated by anentity other than the designated neighborhood administrator.
 7. Themethod as recited in claim 6, further comprising: receiving an offerfrom a node to be the neighborhood administrator; and designating thenode to be the neighborhood administrator by at least one other meshrouter.
 8. The method as recited in claim 6, wherein the receivingcomprises: receiving one or more packets via at least one wirelesscommunication.
 9. The method as recited in claim 6, wherein thereceiving comprises: receiving the notification via an out-of-bandavenue.
 10. The method as recited in claim 6, wherein the receivingcomprises: receiving an identification of the delinquent router.
 11. Themethod as recited in claim 6, wherein the identification of thecertificate comprises a copy of the certificate.
 12. The method asrecited in claim 6, wherein the excluding comprises: storing anexclusion indication that is mapped to an identification of thedelinquent router.
 13. The method as recited in claim 6, wherein theexcluding comprises: storing an exclusion indication that is mapped to acertificate that is associated with the delinquent router.
 14. A meshrouter that is capable of establishing a wireless mesh network withother mesh routers, the mesh router further capable of designating atleast one other mesh router as a single neighborhood administrator, theneighborhood administrator deciding whether to exclude a delinquent meshrouter certificate; the mesh router comprising at least one processorand one or more media configured to store amesh-router-producing-entity-issued certificate of a plurality ofcertificates issued by a mesh-router-producing entity, the storedcertificate comprising a name, a signature, and a public key, whereinthe name corresponds to a name of the mesh router, the signaturecorresponds to an authentication by the mesh-router-producing entity,and the public key certifying that themesh-router-producing-entity-issued certificate is bound to the name ofthe mesh router and configured to store processor-executableinstructions capable of being executed by the at least on processor; themesh router designated as the single neighborhood administratorconfigured to grant other mesh routers that possess at least one of theplurality of certificates issue by the mesh-router-producing entity,access to the wireless mesh network; the mesh router configured toexclude another mesh router that is associated with a particularcertificate when the particular certificate has been identified asdelinquent and sent by the designated neighborhood administrator;wherein the particular certificate that is associated with the anothermesh router comprises a name of the another mesh router, a signaturecreated by a producing entity, and a public key corresponding to theanother mesh router.
 15. The mesh router as recited in claim 14, whereinthe certificate is included in the mesh router during production. 16.The mesh router as recited in claim 14, wherein the mesh router isfurther configured to exclude the other mesh router by refusing toforward packets that are authenticated by the other mesh router.
 17. Themesh router as recited in claim 14, wherein the mesh router is furtherconfigured to exclude the other mesh router by refusing to perform anauthentication key exchange protocol with the other mesh router.
 18. Themesh router as recited in claim 14, wherein the mesh router is furtherconfigured to exclude the other mesh router by mapping, in a datastructure of the mesh router, an exclusion indication to (i) anidentifier of the other mesh router, (ii) the particular certificate,and/or (iii) a secret key shared between the mesh router and the othermesh router.
 19. One or more processor-accessible computer storage mediacomprising processor-executable instructions that, when executed, directa device to perform actions comprising: storing amesh-router-producing-entity-issued certificate of a plurality ofcertificates issued by a mesh-router-producing entity, the storedcertificate comprising a name, a signature, and a public key, whereinthe name corresponds to a name of a mesh router, the signaturecorresponds to an authentication by the mesh-router-producing entity,and the public key certifying that themesh-router-producing-entity-issued certificate is bound to the name ofthe mesh router; initializing by designating at least one other meshrouter as a single neighborhood administrator, the initializeddesignated neighborhood administrator offering to be the neighborhoodadministrator, deciding whether to exclude a delinquent mesh routercertificate; granting, by the single neighborhood administrator, accessto a network to mesh routers that possess at least one of the pluralityof certificates issued by the mesh-router-producing entity; receivingthe delinquent mesh router certificate and notification of theassociated delinquent mesh router from the single neighborhoodadministrator, the delinquent mesh router certificate comprising a nameof the delinquent mesh router, the notification being signed by thesingle neighborhood administrator to authenticate the notification, anda public key corresponding to the delinquent mesh router; and excludingthe delinquent mesh router certificate responsive to the authenticatednotification received from the designated neighborhood administrator.20. The one or more processor-accessible computer storage media asrecited in claim 19, wherein the action of receiving comprises an actionof: receiving the notification wherein the notification identifies thedelinquent mesh router certificate such that a mesh router that isassociated with the delinquent mesh router certificate can be determineddirectly from the delinquent mesh router certificate and from a storeddata structure.
 21. The one or more processor-accessible computerstorage media as recited in claim 19, wherein the action of excludingcomprises an action of: mapping an exclusion indication to at least oneof the delinquent mesh router certificate and an identifier of a meshrouter that is associated with the delinquent mesh router certificate.22. A system for implementing an exclusion capability, the systemcomprising: coupling means for communicatively coupling a mesh routerwith one or more other mesh routers on a network; storing means forstoring a mesh-router-producing-entity-issued certificate of a pluralityof certificates issued by a mesh-router-producing entity, the storedcertificate comprising a name, a signature, and a public key, whereinthe name corresponds to a name of the mesh router, the signaturecorresponds to an authentication by the mesh-router-producing entity,and the public key certifying that themesh-router-producing-entity-issued certificate is bound to the name ofthe mesh router and processor-executable instructions capable of beingexecuted by the at least one processor; designation means fordesignating at least one other mesh router as a single neighborhoodadministrator, the neighborhood administrator deciding whether toexclude a delinquent mesh router certificate; granting means forgranting access to the network to mesh routers that possess at least oneof the plurality of certificates issued by the mesh-router-producingentity; detection means for detecting the delinquent mesh router of theone or more mesh routers of the network and deciding whether to excludethe delinquent mesh router certificate associated with the delinquentmesh router, the delinquent mesh router certificate comprising a name ofthe delinquent mesh router, a signature created by a producing entity,and a public key corresponding to the delinquent mesh router; receivingmeans for receiving the delinquent mesh router certificate and anotification of an associated delinquent mesh router from the designatedneighborhood administrator; and exclusion means for excluding thedelinquent mesh router responsive to the notification and based on thedelinquent mesh router certificate associated with the delinquent meshrouter, the delinquent mesh router certificate comprising the name ofthe delinquent mesh router, the signature created by a producing entity,and the public key corresponding to the delinquent mesh router.
 23. Thesystem as recited in claim 22, wherein the exclusion means comprises:refusal means for refusing to forward packets that are authenticated bythe delinquent router and/or for refusing to perform an authenticationkey exchange protocol with the delinquent mesh router.
 24. The system asrecited in claim 22, wherein the system comprises a mesh router.
 25. Thesystem as recited in claim 22, wherein the system comprises one or moreprocessor-accessible computer storage media.